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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
However, this analogy cannot successfully be asserted because an
animal can be chained or fenced in, whereas a human is not amen-
able to such measures. Parents cannot be held to the degree of
liability of one harboring a vicious dog after notice of its viciousness.
Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929) (dictum).
Therefore, the ultimate issue will resolve itself into the question
of whether the parent exercised reasonable care under the circum-
stances.
West Virginia has not been confronted with the issue pre-
sented in the principal case. However, due to the enactment
of the parental liability statute dealing with the malicious destruc-
tion of property by minors, it appears that the trend in West
Virginia is toward placing more responsibility upon the parent.
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 7A, §§ 1,2 (Michie 1961). Therefore,
a complaint similar to the one in the case at bar would probably
be upheld as stating a cause of action. As a practical matter, proving
that the parent took no reasonable measures to restrain the child,
knowing of his dangerous or vicious propensities, would present a
difficult evidentiary problem. Cases seem to indicate that admonish-
ment by the parent would relieve him of liability if such were a
reasonable means of parental authority. Acts of incorrigible children
are not subject to the rule propounded by the principal case, for
no amount of parental discipline would be effective.
David Mayer Katz
ABSTRACTS
Federal Courts-Three Judge Court and Pre-emption
The Georgia legislature enacted a statute requiring that tobacco
sold at auction within that state be identified by tag according to
type. Operators of the tobacco warehouses brought action in the
federal district court to restrain state officials from enforcing the
act, ofn the basis that federal legislation had pre-empted the field.
A three-judge court was convened and granted the requested relief.
On direct appeal to the United State Supreme Court, held, affirmed
on the merits with no discussion of the propriety of the use of a
three-judge court. Campbell v. Hussy, 82 Sup. Ct. 327 (1961).
It is surprising that neither the Court nor the parties questioned
the convening of a three-judge court on the matter. In Ex Parte
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Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that a federal
court might enjoin a state officer from enforcing a state statute
which was unconstitutional, in spite of the eleventh amendment.
Immediately, steps were taken to limit the decision by both case
decisions and statutory enactment. Section 2281 of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), enacted shortly after the Young
decision, provided that where an injunction against enforcement
of a state statute was sought on federal constitutional grounds three
judges would be convened to determine on the matter before a
final decree would be rendered, and allowed appeal directly to the
Supreme Court. After the decision in the Young case and the en-
actment of the three-judge act, there followed a long line of cases
in which the three-judge court convened to determine on questions
involving constitutionality of state statutes. However, the Court
clearly distinguished between constitutional question and pre-emption,
and though it expressly indicated that a claim of pre-emption which
it regarded as nonconstitutional could properly be joined with a
constitutional question; it invariably decided on the basis of the con-
stitutional question. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960); Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341
(1943); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); Lemke
v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 65 (1922). The distinction the
Court had made between pre-emption and constitutional question as
basis for convening a three-judge court was commented upon in
74 HARv. L. REv. 137 (1960), as precipitated by the dissenting
opinion in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen,
supra. In Ex parte Bruder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926), wherein a single
district judge had issued a permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement of a state statute as pre-empted by federal legislation, the
Court held a claim of federal pre-emption was not a constitutional
claim requiring the convening of a three-judge court. In view of
the purposes of the three-judge act, a considered and deliberate
determination of the propriety of interference by the federal judiciary
with state government, it is not surprising to note the extension of
the three-judge court into the area of pre-emption. It is unusual
though, that the step is taken with no note of prior precedent.
Procedure-First Case on New West Virginia Civil Rules
In February of 1960 an action of trespass on the case was
brought in the Circuit Court of Ohio County against the county court.
1962 ]
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D demurred asserting governmental immunity. Pending hearing on
the demurrer, the court requested P to file written answer to certain
questions. The court then sustained the demurrer and P filed an
amended declaration. On July 6, 1960, after the effectuation of
the new rules of civil procedure, D filed a motion to dismiss the
action on the ground that the amended declaration failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted-a motion under rule 12
(b) (6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. At the
hearing on the motion, the circuit court considered the original decla-
ration, the demurrer, the written answers of P to question propounded
by the court and the amended declaration, and treated the motion
to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under rule 56, W. Va.
R.C.P. 56, and thereupon rendered summary judgment for D. P
assigned error to the sustaining of D's motion. Held, where there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, a summary judgment shall
be rendered. Petros v. Kellas, 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961).
The court, in arriving at a test to determine the basis for dis-
missal under summary judgment, went to prior West Virginia cases
dealing with directed verdicts, and then to interpretation of the like
rule in federal courts. Petros v. Kellas, supra at 185. In closing,
the court stated that a judgment of dismissal under rule 12 (b), or
final summary judgment under rule 56, is not reviewable upon
certificate, but only upon appeal. Petros v. Kellas, supra at 186.
Procedure-Questions to Determine Use of Peremptory Challenges
Counsel for P during the voir dire examination requested
the court to inquire of the jurors whether upon proof that D's
negligence caused pecuniary damages to P of 20,000 dollars, they
would be willing to return a verdict in that amount. The court
refused to allow the question. P assigned error. Held, the court in
the exercise of its discretion may limit the extent of the interrogator-
ies propounded the jurors. This was clearly a proper exercise of
discretion. The court then ignored the prior civil precedent of
Dimmack v. Wheeling Traction Co., 58 W. Va. 226, 52 S.E. 101
(1905), which stated it is not error for the court to refuse questions
when the sole purpose thereof is to aid in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, and adopted the view of a prior criminal case, State v.
Stonestreet, 112 W. Va. 668, 166 S.E. 378 (1932), which held that
L Vol. 64
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jurors might be questioned on voir dire examination within reason-
able limits in order for the parties to intelligently exercise their
peremptory challenges. Henthorn v. Long, 122 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va.
1961).
The Stonestreet decision was preceded in its variation from the
Dimmack decision, at least in dicta, by State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va.
652, 658, 125 S.E. 758, 760 (1924), which indicated the accused
was entitled to propose questions to the jurors which might furnish
him with information of value in exercising his peremptory challenge
where it did not actually provide grounds for disqualifying the juror
for cause. Prior to the principal case, a distinction might have been
attempted, though none is suggested, on the basis of whether the
case was on the criminal or civil docket. The adoption of the de-
cision in Stonestreet in Henthorn v. Long, supra, though unnecessary
to the decision has negated that possibility, while increasing the
import of the Stonestreet case as precedent and bringing West Vir-
ginia more in line with the procedure in other jurisdictions. In most
jurisdictions the jurors may be questioned within reasonable limits
to allow the counsel to elicit facts which will enable them to in-
telligently exercise their peremptory challenges. As to whether the
proffered questions are within the confine of reasonable limits-
therein lies the discretion of the court. 50 C.I.S. Juries § 279 (1947).
Property-Liability of Attorney to Beneficiary in Preparing a Wm
An attorney preparing the will of his client fell into the trap of
the California statutory provisions relating to the rule against perpet-
uities. Upon admission of the will to probate, a trust provision of the
will was determined invalid as in violation of rules relating to perpet-
uities and restraint on alienation. Thereupon, a beneficiary under
the invalid provision brought an action against the attorney for loss
suffered through the attorney's negligence. Held, on these particular
facts the attorney was not negligent. The court, however, went on
to overrule a long standing and well established decision in holding
that a beneficiary suffering loss of testamentary rights through negli-
gence of an attorney employed by the testator may recover either
in tort or contract as a third-party beneficiary. Lucas v. Hamm,
364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
The general rule as stated in 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
§ 140 (1953); 5 AM. JuR. Attorneys at Law § 147 (1936), is that
1962 ]
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though an attorney is liable for negligence to his client, he is not
liable to third parties who through his negligence have been deprived
of their testamentary shares under the will. The leading decision
in this area was Buckly v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895),
which the present case expressly overruled. In the Buckly case,
the court, presented with similar facts, had held that the losing
beneficiary could not maintain an action as a third-party beneficiary
because of lack of privity with the contracting parties.
The Buckly decision reigned for some sixty years before
it was even challenged. Then, in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958), the court in holding a notary public liable to
an intended beneficiary deprived of his testamentary share through
the notary's negligent preparation of a will, pointed out that the
stringent requirements for privity of the Buckly v. Gray era had
been greatly relaxed. Though this decision may have portended a
change in view, the circumstances of the case were such that the
court's decision could possibly have been regarded as a morally
justified deviation rather than a reversal of precedent. Now, with the
Lucas v. Hamm decision, the jurisdiction which had established the
general law on the subject has conclusively reversed itself. There
is little law in point in other jurisdictions of the country, none in
West Virginia. Though a division of authority between the two
decisions is more probable than a general acceptance of the law in
Lucas v. Hamm, the reasoning of the justices in that case in liberaliz-
ing recovery to a third-party beneficiary is parallel to that develop-




Barr: Abstracts of Recent Cases
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
